The Replit story keeps coming back to me. No attacker, no exploit, just an agent that had access it didn't need and used it at the worst possible moment. "What can this model reach?" is such a better question than "is this model safe?" One you can actually enforce.
The ambient authority point is what most teams are missing. Everyone's building prompt filters and jailbreak classifiers while the real problem is agents sitting on standing access they should never have had in the first place.
One thing worth adding: the blast radius problem gets worse because agents chain tool calls autonomously, so a single scoped permission can get combined with three other scoped permissions in ways no one reviewed. It's less like giving a tenant a key to one room and more like giving them a key that can be combined with other tenants' keys to open doors nobody designed for. Are you seeing teams actually implement per-call authorization (checking intent at each tool invocation) or just static role-based scoping at session start?
Treating LLM output as untrusted input is the mental model most teams are still missing. I’ve watched an agent’s tool call get treated as authoritative simply because it came from our own model, which defeats the whole point of a trust boundary. Do you scope credentials per agent session or per tool call?
You're still treating agent security like a classical containment problem. It's a mistake. Jailing an LLM's output in a microVM is just patching the symptom. The real threat isn't that the agent behaves badly. It's that your execution runtime allows bad behavior to exist as a valid physical state in the first place.
When you run an autonomous agent, you're running a probabilistic engine. If its tool calls aren't compiled directly into immutable, hardware-attested AST schemas, you've already lost. A container boundary is a soft, user-space illusion. A dynamic linker preload bypasses it in milliseconds.
We have to collapse the delay between action and verification. The runtime shouldn't decide if an action is safe after it's generated. The action must compile into a physical memory page where invalid transitions can't physically manifest. This isn't theoretical. It's the difference between a 1.2 billion CPU cycle cold boot and a 24,000 instruction page-table rollback.
If your database agent can even construct a malformed schema change, your platform's geometry is broken. We don't need thicker sandboxes. We need systems where violation is a mathematical impossibility.
What's the absolute limit of your current sandbox when an agent starts rewriting its own execution hooks?
FIDES (build on top of Informational control scheme) which provides deterministic security model for all outbound calls; depends on accurate data labels .
The Replit story keeps coming back to me. No attacker, no exploit, just an agent that had access it didn't need and used it at the worst possible moment. "What can this model reach?" is such a better question than "is this model safe?" One you can actually enforce.
The ambient authority point is what most teams are missing. Everyone's building prompt filters and jailbreak classifiers while the real problem is agents sitting on standing access they should never have had in the first place.
One thing worth adding: the blast radius problem gets worse because agents chain tool calls autonomously, so a single scoped permission can get combined with three other scoped permissions in ways no one reviewed. It's less like giving a tenant a key to one room and more like giving them a key that can be combined with other tenants' keys to open doors nobody designed for. Are you seeing teams actually implement per-call authorization (checking intent at each tool invocation) or just static role-based scoping at session start?
Treating LLM output as untrusted input is the mental model most teams are still missing. I’ve watched an agent’s tool call get treated as authoritative simply because it came from our own model, which defeats the whole point of a trust boundary. Do you scope credentials per agent session or per tool call?
You're still treating agent security like a classical containment problem. It's a mistake. Jailing an LLM's output in a microVM is just patching the symptom. The real threat isn't that the agent behaves badly. It's that your execution runtime allows bad behavior to exist as a valid physical state in the first place.
When you run an autonomous agent, you're running a probabilistic engine. If its tool calls aren't compiled directly into immutable, hardware-attested AST schemas, you've already lost. A container boundary is a soft, user-space illusion. A dynamic linker preload bypasses it in milliseconds.
We have to collapse the delay between action and verification. The runtime shouldn't decide if an action is safe after it's generated. The action must compile into a physical memory page where invalid transitions can't physically manifest. This isn't theoretical. It's the difference between a 1.2 billion CPU cycle cold boot and a 24,000 instruction page-table rollback.
If your database agent can even construct a malformed schema change, your platform's geometry is broken. We don't need thicker sandboxes. We need systems where violation is a mathematical impossibility.
What's the absolute limit of your current sandbox when an agent starts rewriting its own execution hooks?
(╯°□°)╯︵ ┻━┻
FIDES (build on top of Informational control scheme) which provides deterministic security model for all outbound calls; depends on accurate data labels .